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ABSTRACT: From a legal perspective, the last three decades can 
be seen as marking a substantial advance in the recognition of the 
rights of indigenous peoples. Beyond divergences in their scope 
and inconsistencies in their effective fulfillment by different na-
tion-states, these rights make room for the expression of “legitimate 
differences” that, until now, have been blocked.
However, certain indigenous claims in particular seem to be 
seen as a problem that is difficult to solve, due to the way in which 
the differentiated rights that frame them would apparently conflict 
with other rights considered universal. In these cases, then, the 
“differences” invoked lose all legitimacy, being discredited and 
subordinated to other legal values.
This article does not examine the conflicts associated with these 
claims from the perspective of the Philosophy of Law or that of 
Political Philosophy, but from an ethnographic analysis that seeks 
to account for how what certain Mapuche claims are putting into 
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crisis is the very idea of “legitimate differences” with which their 
rights are addressed. On this basis, it argues that a broadening of 
the idea of human rights would suffice to create frameworks that 
allow disagreements to be processed, without resorting to clauses 
that obliterate them asymmetrically, by programmatically subor-
dinating differentiated rights to universal rights
In November 2017, the Albatros Group of the Argentine 
Naval Prefecture assassinated Rafael Nahuel in the framework 
of an operation to evict members of the Lof Relmu Lafken Winkul 
Mapu, who had recovered lands under the control of the Na-
huel Huapi National Park Administration, thirty kilometers 
southbound from San Carlos de Bariloche, in the Argentine 
North-Patagonia. This has not been the first land reclamation 
undertaken by members of the Mapuche-Tewelche People 
and, unfortunately, not the first death in a similar context.1 In 
August of that same year, there was the disappearance fol-
lowed by the death of Santiago Maldonado, even without a 
court ruling assigning responsibility for this death, when the 
Gendarmerie sought to evict a roadblock that members of Pu 
Lof in Resistance of the Cushamen Department in the province of 
Chubut were carrying out to ask for the freedom of their logko 
or spiritual political leader Facundo Jones Huala, until now 
imprisoned in Chile.2
However, since then, “la Winkul” (as it is referred to locally) 
constitutes a leading case in terms of how Mapuche demands 
are received in the country for different reasons. On the one 
hand, because both then and today, its members have repeat-
edly stated that, if there is another eviction attempt, “they 
will take us dead out of here.” On the other hand, because 
the conflict has not been limited to the Administration of the 
Nahuel Huapi National Park as a state entity that initiates the 
complaint of usurpation, but has been extended to residents 
of the nearby town of Villa Mascardi, San Carlos de Bariloche 
and the country. Thus, in addition to different legal cases for 
“usurpation” against the women of the community (the only 
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ones identified since the men wear hoods so as not to be rec-
ognized) and to the two young people who brought Rafael 
Nahuel’s dying body to the route where the security forces 
were, in order to receive help, there have been other legal 
cases of individuals against members of the community and 
also against certain state officials for not making the eviction 
effective. Of note, various public demonstrations have taken 
place throughout 2020 on the route near the entrance to the Lof 
and in Bariloche itself, of people who mobilize under different 
slogans: “No to violence,” “Yes to peaceful life,” “Respect for 
private property,” “That Justice act in a timely manner,” “We 
don’t want more occupiers; the state must defend public and 
private domains,” “No to the breakings,” “Security for the res-
idents of Villa Mascardi, park rangers and users of routes and 
beaches.” All this is within the framework of disqualifications, 
that those who support the recovery are not truly Mapuche 
but terrorists instead, or that the reasons they use to remain in 
place are nothing more than a “mystical delusion,” based on 
“extrasensory messages,” “supposedly received” by the person 
whom not only the Winkul but also other Mapuche-Tewelche 
communities and organizations recognize as machi, or spiritual 
advisor and healer. 
From the reasons given by the members of the Winkul and 
the machi herself, the decision to protect that particular place 
responds to a legitimate action of historical reparation. It thus 
seeks justice for the way in which the Mapuche-Tewelche 
people who lived free in the region were successively and 
systematically assassinated, evicted, and expropriated by the 
military campaigns of the last quarter of the 19th century, and 
later by other state organisms and individuals until today. In 
addition to this, it is also explained that the one who was still a 
machil then, as she was training with other advisors and spiri-
tual healers to become a full machi, received the mandate of the 
kiufikecheyem or ancestors to raise her rewe or ceremonial center 
precisely in that place. Likewise, once installed in the place, all 
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the members of the Lof sealed a commitment of mutual care 
and respect with sentient beings that inhabit there. On the one 
hand, their commitment with ancestors murdered in that area, 
whose pullü or spirit was left without being able to complete 
the eltun or road to Pullü Mapu or spiritual land, since their 
next of kin were not been able to perform the corresponding 
eluwün or funeral ceremony. On the other, a commitment also 
with different pu newen or forces and pu gen or spiritual owners 
of vital elements and species of the place. They’ve explained 
that breaking this pact, would have serious consequences for 
them but also for those who live in the region (whether they 
are Mapuche or not) that could be expressed through diseases, 
catastrophes, and deaths.
There are many subtleties that highlight the growing conflict 
that this case has been acquiring, in a context marked by vio-
lence and reciprocal violence between the confronted parties. 
In this article, I focus on analyzing what it involves and pub-
licly expresses in terms of contesting and disqualifying rights. 
I do not do this from a perspective of Philosophy of Law or 
Political Philosophy, but from an ethnographic analysis that 
seeks to account for how what certain Mapuche demands are 
putting into crisis is the very idea of “legitimate differences” 
from which the members of the lot of community justify (and 
others question) their actions. On this basis, I argue that a 
broadening of the idea of human rights would suffice to create 
frameworks that would allow disagreement to be processed 
without obliterating it asymmetrically, and without program-
matically subordinating Mapuche-Tewelche rights to rights 
reputed to be “universal.” Ultimately, this is what has been 
clearly expressed in the Collective Document produced by the 
Tehuelche Rankulche Mapuche Autonomous Parliament, held 
in Relmu Lafken Winkul Mapu, on November 24, 2020, where 
it is clearly stated that “the existing legislation, in terms of rec-
ognitions of rights, is limited and restrictive.”3 To do this, I first 
briefly examine the foundations that give meaning to the exis-
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tence of universal human rights and differentiated rights and 
the tensions often linked to their articulation. Below I analyze 
another way of thinking about what, in this case, the conflict-
ing parties put into play when they wield or denounce ideas 
about what are the “legitimate differences” to be recognized 
at the time of settling certain claims as just or inadmissible. I 
finish by looking at how the associated conflicts could recede in 
finding another way of thinking about “human rights.” I thus 
present new arguments from the Mapuche-Tewelche experi-
ence, to an idea anticipated by Viaenne (2017) regarding the 
protection of the right to life of water, rivers, and forests as a 
new legal argument. In this sense, coinciding with the statement 
by Izquierdo and Viaene (2018), I take as a starting point their 
assertion that “the hegemonic vision of human rights has not 
yet faced the pressing challenges caused by indigenous visions 
that question the divisions of the dominant modern ontology 
between culture/nature, mind/body, human/non-human, 
and belief/reality.”
From Types of Discrimination to Rights as an Antidote
The anthropological field has been forged in settling the 
relationships between nature and culture and between the 
universal and the particular without questioning both divi-
sions in themselves. Hence the relationship between human 
rights and differentiated rights has been extensively debated, 
so as to circumvent the failures of  reducing the issue to two 
opposed and extreme abstract and polarized positions (Juliano 
1997; Merry 1992 and 2006; Zechenter 1997; Dahre 2017). On 
the one hand, there is no doubt that the 1948 Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights is an initiative clearly geolocated in its 
gestation that, like other legal-political engineering initiatives 
of the modern capitalist world-system, has been imposed as a 
global parameter of values in principle considered “a-cultural” 
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or valid for all the different “cultures,” that is, as universal. 
There are therefore those who defend such universality above 
all other considerations, as a way of agreeing on and regulating 
healthy inter- and intra-state coexistences. In any case, the rec-
ognition of this operation as an imposition says less about the 
values themselves than about the selective ways of adopting 
and generalizing them. On the other hand, there are those who 
(emphasizing the exclusions and subordinations legitimized 
by that operation) see such universalization as a sign of the co-
loniality of power (Espinel Bernal 2015; Pérez Volonterio 2018; 
Sánchez Rubio 2015) and denounce its Euro- and Anglo-centric 
perspective from the positive recognition of one’s own values.
As an anthropologist, rather than analyzing the conflict 
between rights and the arguments to resolve it abstractly, I 
analytically approach the question as part of social processes 
of dispute that historically enable and stabilize languages of 
contention, within the framework of processes of construction 
of cultural hegemonies that are always open to controversy, at 
least to some extent (Roseberry 1994). This is demonstrated by 
the conceptualization of successive generations of rights (cur-
rently under review [Domaradzki, Khvostova and Pupovac 
2019; Zieck 1992]) which were expanded over time. In any case, 
my departing point coincides with de Sousa Santos (2002: 59), in 
that “human rights can (and have been) used to advance both 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forms of globalization.” 
From these starting points, I fully adhere to the core signifi-
cance of what is already in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, as a point of stabilization of coexistence agreements that 
has sought to stop certain abuses that still occur in different 
parts of the world. For this reason, I speak and write from a 
“we” that is the “we” of human rights and the “we” of their 
authority, in terms of consolidating worthy forms of global co-
existence. However, in this article I am interested in challenging 
certain truisms of that “we,” from the viewpoint of certitudes 
“otherwise” (Escobar 2003; Palermo 2009) that arise from the 
ethnographic analysis of their processes of implementation, 
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processes that show how human rights are demanded and, 
at the same time, how they are disputed. My argument at this 
point is that, if honoring the declaration of human rights solves 
certain core problems of our failed coexistence, paradoxically 
that makes other issues invisible and inaudible, and it is pre-
cisely this asymmetry that is exacerbating certain conflicts. 
Therefore, I strongly value the commitment to uphold the 
rights and freedoms to which every human being can aspire 
in an inalienable way and under conditions of equality. Un-
doubtedly, the statement that “all human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights” allows us to combat one of the 
forms of discrimination that are ominous and repudiable and 
that I call “type 1 discrimination.” The antidote to this form 
of discrimination is clear in the introduction of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights written in 2015 by Zeid Ra’ad 
Al Hussein, who was the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights between 2014 and 2018. Al Hussein said: 
The Universal Declaration promises all people economic, 
social, political, cultural and civic rights that support a life 
without misery and without fear (...) They are the inalienable 
rights of all people, at all times and in all places: of people of 
all colors, of all races and ethnicities, disabled or not, citizens 
or migrants, regardless of gender, class, caste, religious belief, 
age or sexual orientation (Naciones Unidas 2015: 6-7).
What is clear then from this idea of discrimination is that to 
discriminate is to make differences between people for reasons 
bound to sex, class, caste, socio-cultural background, religious 
belief, age, or sexual orientation. Clearly, the universal rights 
are the antidote to this type of discrimination.
We also know that social struggles have always made it 
possible to expand the type of rights to be considered. That is 
why different events after the 1948 Declaration were showing 
that it did not remedy another form of discrimination, which I 
call “type 2 discrimination.” That is, discrimination also occurs 
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when there is no room for legitimate differences that, in the 
case of indigenous peoples, would be considered in principle as 
sociocultural, but with a different density than that recognized 
by what are simply defined as “cultural rights.” That is why 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples exists and had to be agreed upon sometime soon, in 
addition to other state and multi-state legal frameworks. Here, 
group-differentiated rights emerge as the antidote to this other 
form of discrimination (Carbonell 2000).
Now, both at the time of its negotiation and in terms of its 
implementation, much has been discussed from Political Phi-
losophy regarding the possible relationships between universal 
rights and the different types of differentiated rights. It is not 
my purpose to review such debates here, but I am interested 
in summarizing what I see as three prevailing positions. Some 
understand that the recognition of differentiated rights con-
spires against the necessary agreements of rights that should 
order even a multipolar world-system (see Mouffe 1999 and 
2004). Others are instead in favor of articulating universal and 
differentiated rights, although in disparate ways. In the latter 
case, while some seek the subordination of the particular to 
the universal when conflicts arise (see Flores Renteria 1999; 
Kymlicka 1996), others seek to complement forms of redistri-
bution that resolve inequities attributable to political economy, 
with forms of recognition as to remedy historical oppressions 
(see Fraser 1997; Young 2001). In this last direction, one can 
bet on fostering a permanent dialogue of knowledge to avoid 
contradictions (cfr. Sieder 2010), or more sophisticated forms 
of exchange from a diatopic hermeneutic, anchored in the prin-
ciple that “people have the right to be equal when difference 
makes them inferior, but they also have the right to be different 
when equality jeopardizes identity” (de Sousa Santos 2002: 81). 
Thus, a good part of these debates focuses on debating either 
the tensions and pre-eminences between individual rights and 
collective rights, or on finding equivalences between cultural 
Briones: FROM  MAPUCHE  PERSPECTIVES 9
values that, in any case, would converge in setting their own 
standards about human dignity which may be different but 
still find ways of translation, for example, through intercultural 
procedural criteria (de Sousa Santos 2002: 68).  
These discussions have been fruitful, but I also understand 
that they lead to certain deadlocks. Furthermore, they are not 
always operative to frame and address certain specific conflicts. 
For this reason, my argument will go a little further forward 
or a little further back. So, I am not interested in looking for 
alternatives by postulating the abstract and difficultly verifiable 
premise that all cultures have isomorphic cultural values that, 
through dialogue, can be made mutually intelligible. Nor do 
I limit the analysis of certain conflicts to what is not fulfilled 
today of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
of the United Nations approved in 2007 or the ILO Convention 
169 issued in 1989 and ratified by 23 countries,4  both adopted 
by Argentina as part of its own constitutional frameworks. 
Basically, the point I make here is that the increase in conflict 
that we are witnessing, at least in northern Patagonia, does not 
happen simply because certain economic, social, and cultural 
rights are not being fulfilled, nor are constitutionally recognized 
indigenous rights. Besides that, the problem is that we have 
reached a point where the bases of disagreement that certain 
claims place in the public arena go through the ways of under-
standing the facts and “the matters of fact.”5 And it is precisely 
on this diagnosis that I base my hypothesis, that if we do not 
modify the idea of human rights promoted by the Universal 
Declaration of 1948, the indigenous demands will not be able 
to be heard or understood, and we will not be able to process 
the disagreement that unleashes conflicts, nor to guarantee a 
fairer and more reliable coexistence. Hence, I would like to 
put forward a twofold proposal, so that indigenous demands 
can be heard and understood in their entity, while we avoid 
being caught in recurrent and equivocal discussions about 
the pre-eminence of universal rights or of the differentiated 
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rights that make it difficult to think about their articulation. 
First, we must expand again our idea of human rights, as we 
have already done it in the past by the pressure of successive 
social demands. Second, we must be willing to decentralize 
the debate around the question of values and creeds, to make 
a more in-depth review of what can be considered a “matter of 
fact.” Or, at least, as de la Cadena (2017: 6-7) argues, we must 
be willing not to attribute in advance and unidirectionally the 
ability to define what is (has the right to be) and what is not 
(thus being lowered to the plane of a mere belief).
Putting the Idea of “Legitimate Differences” in Crisis   
In this section, I propose to argue that the apparently 
insoluble nature of certain conflicts (and even the escalation 
of violence that they provoke) results from the fact that it is 
precisely the idea of “legitimate differences” that is put into 
crisis. And this is so not only in the sense that some of these 
differences are considered inappropriate (denying, for example, 
the ethnicity of those who wield them) but also in that certain 
broad sectors dismiss their reality and, therefore, their entity. 
As an effect, at most they are lowered to the status of beliefs 
that, as such, can in any case be confined to the private sphere, 
but cannot be taken into account as a rational public argument 
to explain what in conflict situations counts as “the reasonable 
facts” to be taken into account to find “solutions” within the 
available frameworks. Therefore, the possibility of introducing 
openings that allow agreeing how to handle these conflicts 
requires starting by recognizing two things. First, that what 
we consider differences usually occurs not so much between 
practices but within the same practice, and that then there may 
be different types of disagreements.6
When we speak for example of sex-generic rights, we may 
have differences about what they should imply and how to 
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implement them. Heteronormative paradigms of conserva-
tive hegemonies will start from the recognition of a binary 
and necessary equivalence between sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation. Other positions will think about sex, gender, and 
sexual orientation in a decoupled way. But in principle, it seems 
incontestable what and about what we are disputing, since 
they are predicated dissensions about the same reality that is 
read, interpreted, or conceptualized differently. That is why I 
consider this type of dissent and the friction that it generates 
as ideological. 
When we refer to indigenous peoples, there are usually 
invoked (as said earlier) sociocultural differences explicitly 
marked as such. Paradoxically, many times, anthropological 
ideas of “the cultural” have been used to maintain that, in any 
case, “they” have culture and beliefs, and “we” (members of 
the majority, non-indigenous, western, hegemonic society, or 
whatever you want to call it) have knowledge. Because it is 
necessary to respect these “cultural differences” in order not to 
incur the type 2 discrimination, a limited recognition of their 
rights is made every time they are not seen colliding, in some 
way, with “our” way of understanding rights.
From this perspective, the collision between universal rights 
and differentiated rights can have different surfaces of emer-
gence. A first tension that was and is often put in evidence is 
that between the individual and the collective. As of today, that 
tension is still not resolved. In Argentina, it is partly respon-
sible for the difficulties in including indigenous community 
property in the Civil Code (Sterpin 2018), which explains why 
the idea of private property continues to emerge (and it does 
so more and more) in sovereign criterion to face intercultural 
conflicts with indigenous groups that recover lands. And this 
despite the fact that article 17 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights says that “Everyone has the right to property, 
individually and collectively.” 
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In any case, beyond disagreements between different no-
tions about the how and why of the notion of property, the 
debate regarding alternatives to reform the Civil Code to reg-
ulate indigenous community property usually operates on the 
same reality and activates ideological frictions regarding how to 
deal with them, no matter if it is agreed or disputed whether 
indigenous lands are not or should (always and in all cases) 
be not seizable, transferable, disposable, and extinguishable 
(Abreut de Begher 2012: 92). 
In any case also, stemming from a narrow assumption of 
disagreements and differences as only and solely ideological or 
cultural, the same UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples sets a limit to dissent, when in its Article 46 subsection 
2 establishes that: “The exercise of the rights established in this 
Declaration will be subject exclusively to the limitations deter-
mined by law and in accordance with international obligations 
in the field of human rights” (Naciones Unidas 2008: 15). 
Specifically, this subordination of the particular, of differ-
ences, to what is understood as a universal good (the liberal 
idea of the individual as a subject of law [Serrano Sánchez 
2008]) enables arguments that I have heard in court hearings. 
Specifically, as the Argentine Civil Code does not recognize in-
digenous community possession and property, in cases where a 
community tries to sue an individual whose title disturbs their 
traditional, current, and public occupation, it is argued that 
claims in this direction are abstract or become abstract (Laplac-
ette 2011), a point on which there is jurisprudence. Often, even 
when this subordination of differentiated rights to universal 
ones has been controversial, the problem has been identified 
and is often argued as a problem of the unjust supremacy of 
the cultural views of some, over the cultural beliefs of others. 
But, conceptually, what is relevant is that this idea of “what 
becomes abstract” is never questioned about what is real, 
about a unique reality and temporality on which the facts are 
established and, from them, the values to defend and prioritize. 
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And the problem is that this way dissent is limited to “our” 
idea of “cultural values” (whether of one or the other), but it 
is not noticed that part of the dissent is also anchored in what 
is considered factual, in what are or are not “facts.” 
For this reason, some time ago, the very anthropology that 
has erected itself on the idea of culture has started questioning 
its premises, by noticing that the most conflictive disagreements 
do not occur simply around “cultural values,” but around what 
we consider real, or what we understand as facts or matters 
of fact. This move has allowed that social and disciplinary 
common sense understandings of “culture” and “cultural dif-
ferences” began to be seen as limited and problematic, while 
prompting different social scientists to rethink what is really 
at stake in certain kinds of disagreements. Briefly, we are now 
aware that continuing to maintain that some of us have knowl-
edge and others have beliefs is a form of epistemicide (de Sousa 
Santos 2009) or of exercising epistemic violence (Spivak 1988; 
Castro Gómez 2000). But we have also begun to understand 
that certain disagreements are not established on the same 
and only transparent and univocal reality, on which it is easy 
to define facts and questions of fact, but on partially different 
realities. In turn, while different ways of world making lead 
to partially different ways of identifying facts or defining 
matters of fact, we have also learned that different ways of un-
derstanding or composing what a “fact” is goes hand by hand 
with different practices of knowing. And I emphasize here the 
idea of partially different realities or worlds, and of partially 
different practices of knowing, because (as I argued) what we 
call differences does not usually occur between practices but 
within the same practice.
And it is when these disagreements are not established 
from talking about the same reality, but from different ways 
of doing and knowing the world or reality, that the idea of 
cultural differences (centered on values and beliefs) becomes 
inoperative. In these cases, it is more appropriate to warn and 
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speak of edges of dissent or friction that, being centered on what 
constitutes the “facts,” we have started calling them ontological 
and epistemological, and not merely cultural or ideological. A few 
examples may clarify the point. 
We were talking with a kimche or Mapuche sage about Ma-
punzungün, a concept that he translated not as the Mapuche 
language or as the word of the people of the earth, but as the 
“language of the living beings of the earth,” so it is worth not-
ing the idea of living beings. He told us then that, by sharing a 
kuifi ngütram or story heard from their elders, the pullü of those 
kuifikecheyem, the spirit of those ancestors, is present in a way 
that “we” do not usually understand more than as a belief or, 
at best, as a symbolic statement. But the presence of these living 
or existents is another entity for those who are counting the 
ngütram.7 In the kimche’s words:
 
Because when you talk, they arrive. Because one feels them 
on one’s back (…) What we say remains much more based 
on reality. It remains, because it is based on reality.
 
In short, the presence of those kuifikecheyem that we do not 
see or hear is nevertheless real, it is “a fact” for the kimche, and 
not only for him. Speaking in turn of the very different occa-
sions in which people have the perimontu experience (which 
has usually been translated as vision) the kimche told us: 
Perimontu? It is a seeing with the eye, like this (he signals the 
eye with his finger). Pe comes from seeing, and perimontu, 
(seeing) the strangeness that is in there (…) The thing is that 
I am (truly) seeing it.
 
And the perimontu is another fact, that surely many of us 
do not see or hear either.
In the same way, we do not usually give enough importance 
to the conviction that these kuifikecheyem speak, teach, warn 
through the pewma or dream, thus giving indications about 
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what should be done or what can happen. We call this convic-
tion “spiritual belief,” although for the Mapuche-Tewelche it is 
also a fact. And the problem is that when we translate perimontu 
as vision, kuifikecheyem as ancestors, pullü as spirit and pewma as 
dream, we think that we are talking about the same things, or 
that we know and understand what we are talking about. But 
this is not the case and that is why it is impossible or at least 
difficult for us to appreciate in the same way what that entails: 
facts for some, symbolic representations for us, of the kind we 
usually call “spiritual,” because we consider them intangible 
abstractions. Even in the face of what appear to be indubitable 
materialities, “things” which for some are mere skeletal remains 
of scientific and historical interest (“collected” mostly during 
the military campaigns of the late nineteenth century), for 
others they incarnate existent beings held “in captivity” still.8
The real problem then is not only the land dispute itself, but 
that our idea of “the spiritual” denies issues that, for the Ma-
puche, have another entity. The kuifikecheyem and other forces 
of the environment such as pu newen and pu ngen are existent 
beings with their own agency, and not symbolic ideas or mere 
representations. Ultimately, they are real and not spiritual or 
imaginary entities, who produce real events and actions, and 
with which real relationships and commitments of mutual care 
are sustained.
This is precisely what is at stake in the refusal of the mem-
bers of the Lof Relmu Lafken Winkul Mapu when, with perse-
verance and despite prosecutions and harassment from the 
security forces and nearby residents, they refuse to leave the 
place. Rather, in the face of each pre-announced possibility of 
eviction, they repeatedly maintain that: “They are going to take 
us out dead, we are not going to leave.”9
It is clear, then, that the conflict is not only anchored in di-
vergent interests and ideological frictions, which by the way 
are also operating.10 What also supports the way in which an-
tagonism has escalated (and even the support received from 
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other Mapuche-Tewelche communities and organizations),11 is 
the way in which the different existents that give foundation 
and entity to the claim are discredited as mere beliefs. Because 
our ideas of facts and reality and our way of making the world 
render the ancestors invisible and inaudible, the intransigence 
of the members of the Lof can only be seen as the result of 
their stubbornness, opportunism, vandalism, or even terrorist 
propensity (Darrieux 2020). 
On the contrary, if it could be seen that, along with ideo-
logical disagreements, other ontological and epistemological 
disagreements are at stake, new ways would be opened for the 
understanding of the foundations of certain conflicts. It could 
be understood that what is also being argued is that an eviction 
would deny the right to life to both the human persons that 
make up the lof, and different existents that also form part of it. 
At the same time, the likelihood of taking into account and as 
a part existents that have not been considered nor counted as 
a part until now (as Jacques Rancière [1996] would say) would 
offer a different framework to begin to process confrontations. 
It is precisely the need to repair this asymmetry of visibilities 
and audibilities that is at the base of my argument about the 
importance of rethinking, updating,  and expanding our idea of 
human rights, to achieve a better and adjusted-to-law coexis-
tence, a fairer coexistence. Summing up the point, if one limits 
the rights to the idea of human persons, or limits the rights of 
the Wall Mapu12 to our idea of environmental rights, one will 
never be able to account for what is demanded, nor for what 
or for whom it is being demanded. At best one would enable a 
circumscribed listening to a banal idea of interculturality, which 
does not realize that what is claimed are broader inter-exis-
tences (Escobar 2020: xvii). Unlike demands of intercultural 
recognition, demands of interexistences include other living 
beings with their own agency. These beings are in the basis 
of all traditional, current, and public occupation of the lands. 
From the Mapuche perspective, they perform actions that are 
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as current, traditional, and public as the acts carried out by 
human persons. And, although we do not see or hear them, 
recognizing the entity of these existents is key (among other 
things) to understand what practices and “facts” (in addition 
to values and beliefs) are often put into play as a foundation 
of certain land and territory claims.
Rethinking our Crucial but Limited Idea of “Human Rights” 
  
I do not doubt that my Mapuche-Tewelche interlocutors 
rever as much as I do Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights when it establishes that “All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights and, endowed as they 
are with reason and conscience, must behave fraternally with 
each other.” I do believe, however, that what in any case they 
are demanding in parallel is simply that we broaden and extend 
that idea of “fraternal behavior” and the values  of equality, 
freedom, and fraternity to other existents. For this, a first step is 
to recognize that, in addition to respecting cultural differences 
and ideological borders, it is imperative to also recognize the 
ontological and epistemological frictions that are active but 
are silenced in and by the conflicts that we call intercultural. I 
would suggest that what ultimately requires the possibility of 
dealing with these frictions in non-violent ways is simply that 
we could also think as subjects of rights to various existing or 
living beings who, from our hegemonic common sense, are 
non-human.
If we ignore these demands, we could even presume that we 
would be, in principle, violating Article 18 of the Declaration 
of 48, which establishes that everyone has “freedom to mani-
fest their religion or belief, individually and collectively, both 
in public and in private, by teaching, practice, worship and 
observance.” But if we could hear and make this expansion, we 
would understand, for example, why, when indigenous peo-
18 URBAN ANTHROPOLOGY  VOL. 49(3, 4), 2020
ples oppose mega-mining enterprises, what they are objecting 
to is that it acts in open violation of Article 5 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Briefly, in their ways of world 
making, these undertakings do nothing but subject the existing 
beings of the place to “torture and cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment or punishment.” If we do not understand it like 
this, from their perspective it is not strange that we are all held 
responsible for these brutal treatments, including human rights 
and even environmental organizations.
As summary, if the conflicts that we call intercultural really 
concern us, I would say that it is not just a matter of comply-
ing, but also of reviewing our idea of rights and, above all, 
our ideas of “facts” and “persons.” And not simply because 
for many indigenous peoples the person is not an individual 
but a social being woven into a collective subject of rights, but 
fundamentally because certain existing beings are also persons, 
in any case not human for us. In any event, they are not simply 
persons in the sense in which certain jurisprudence already 
speaks of certain animals as non-human persons (Peters 2016), 
but in a very different sense. I would also say that, by not do-
ing so, the indigenous peoples will continue to be convinced 
that the we of human rights continues to violate article 7 of 
the Declaration that states that “We all have the right to equal 
protection against all discrimination.” 
Today this extension of rights may seem, perhaps, very 
counter-intuitive. However, it is not something that the we on 
human rights have not gone through or experienced before. 
And I make a parallel to finish clarifying the point.
It has been the movements that began as LGBT and now 
define themselves as LGBTIQA + that have helped heterosex-
uals to increasingly decouple the supposed iron equivalence 
between sex, gender, and sexual orientation that seemed un-
shakable a few decades ago. Likewise, it is  becoming increas-
ingly tangible that indigenous demands are vying to make 
clear that, for them, different existents are at stake in many 
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of the disagreements that are straining our coexistence. Now 
then, having been repeatedly alerted to who also makes up 
that “all” from indigenous perspectives, the time has come to 
wonder: For how long would if be still admissible, as a justi-
fication or as an excuse, that our legal frameworks persevere 
in not acknowledging them as a part simply because they are 




Republic	 of	 Chile,	 and	 the	 different	 identities	 of	 the	 Tehuelche	
people	mainly	 in	Argentine	Patagonia.	However,	 it	does	 recog-
nize	as	well	 an	 early	migration	of	 the	 former	 to	 the	 east	of	 the	
Andes	Mountains,	known	in	the	literature	as	the	“Araucanization	
of	Pampa	and	Patagonia.”	The	interpretation	of	all	these	process-
es	 and	 cultural	 characterizations	 is	 currently	disputed	by	more	
contemporary	studies,	both	 in	 terms	of	 the	 temporal	depth	and	
characteristics	of	these	exchanges,	as	well	as	their	dynamics	and	










ple	 self-identified	 as	 indigenous	 or	 descendants	 of	 indigenous	
people	(2.4%	of	the	total	population),	113,680	identify	themselves	
as	Mapuche	(in	Chubut,	Neuquén,	Río	Negro,	Santa	Cruz,	Tierra	










population	 (CADPI	2017,	CEPAL	2012,	 INDEC	2015).	Take	 into	
account	 that	 different	 sources	 have	 denounced	 the	 under-rep-
resentation	of	 indigenous	self-identifications	 linked	 to	 the	same	
limitations	 of	 the	 census	 process.	 See,	 for	 example,	 Trinchero	
(2010).
 2 Antecedents of land recoveries by Mapuche-Tewelche collectives 
can be found in Briones and Ramos (2020). To appreciate the re-
percussions of both deaths in the immediate political context, see 
Briones and Ramos (2018).
 3 Mapuche Nation. Collective document of the Mapuche Autono-
mous Parliament Tehuelche Rankulche. Latin American Summa-




 4 Of those 23 countries, 15 are from Latin America and the Carib-
bean. List of countries available in https://www.ilo.org/dyn/
normlex/es/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRU-
MENT_ID:312314 (accessed on November 30, 2020).
 5 By this I mean “matters of fact” in the sense of Latour (2004: 244), 
that is, as “The indisputable ingredients of sensation or of exper-
imentation; the term is used to emphasize the political oddity of 
the distinction, imposed by the old Constitution, between what is 
disputable (theories, opinions, interpretations, values) and what 
is indisputable (sensory data).”
 6 I have developed this identification of types of dissent elsewhere 
(Briones 2014), in clear dialogue with the political ontology pro-
gram systematized by Mario Blaser (2009, 2013, 2016; Blaser and 
de la Cadena 2009), and to which they also make key contribu-
tions Marisol de la Cadena (2010, 2014, 2015, 2016) and Arturo Es-
cobar (2012 and 2016), among other authors framed in this branch 
of the ontological turn. However, my proposal not to speak, for 
example, of ontological conflicts, but of ontological edges or fric-
tions (Briones 2020) has in turn incorporated some suggestions by 
Tim Ingold (2018), with the purpose of both avoiding totalizations 
and analyzing the conflictivities as processes and not mere occa-
sional confrontations between different positions in toto.
 7 The literature on the ngütram, the kuifikecheyem, or other expres-
sions of Mapuche-Tewelche daily life is extensive. By way of 
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guidance and because they are linked to the region under review, 
see, for example, Briones and Ramos (2016); Golluscio (2006); Ra-
mos (2010).
 8 That is why in the Parliament of Communities held in la Winkul 
in November 2020, reference is made to the sayings of a papay or 
elderly woman who referred to the Museum of La Plata (formerly 
the Museum of Natural History) as the place that “still has ‘in 
captivity’ our ancestors (sic).” See reference to the document in 
note 3.
 9 Affirmations of this type have been and continue to be recur-
rent, and are even repeated in the comparatively few public 
media that publish testimonies from members of the Lof, from a 
non-stigmatizing perspective. See, for example, “From the day 
before they were hunting us,” in the national newspaper page 
12 of 11/28/2017, available at https://www.pagina12.com.
ar/78932-desde-el-dia-anterior-nos-estaban-cazando (accessed 
12/5/2020). What is relevant is that almost a year later, within 
the framework of the creation of a dialogue roundtable, one of 
the spokespersons of the Lof reiterates that “we are not going to 
leave the place, if they want us to leave they are going to take us 
dead” (in “New dialogue table between the Mapuche communi-
ty and National Parks,” in the virtual local newspaper ANB of 
7/17/2018, available at https://www.anbariloche.com.ar/noti-
cias/2018/07/17/65013?fb_comment_id=1818536511547175_181
9694928098000, accessed 12/5/2020). And almost three years af-
ter the first eviction attempt, within the framework of the protests 
of the neighbors mentioned at the beginning of this article, in a 
national newspaper the same spokesperson reiterates: “We have 
a commitment to the land, they are going to take us out dead, we 
do not give it up and we do not negotiate it, we take care of it 
(the land)” (in “Claims crossed in two marches for the occupation 
of land in Villa Mascardi,” La Nación digital of 5/9/2020, avail-
able at https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/reclamos-cruza-
dos-dos-marchas-ocupacion-tierras-villa-nid2441822, accessed on 
12/5/2020).
 10 In this direction, I have argued more extensively elsewhere (Bri-
ones 2019: 419) how the invisibility of ontological and epistemo-
logical frictions “aggravates a feeling of ignorance that, given 
within the framework of recognition laws already achieved, leads 
to mistrust of the possibility of a just and broadened “being to-
gether” within that framework and, therefore, to radicalize ways 
of demanding that not only question procedures or goals that are 
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not fulfilled or barely fulfilled, but also reject those frameworks in 
themselves.”
11 The ways of making visible the demands that the members of la 
Winkul have implemented is what has largely transformed them 
into a leading case that is reviled from two main arguments. First, 
that the “good” or “true” Mapuche are not violent. Then and 
consequently, that the Mapuche-Tewelche communities and or-
ganizations that opt  for other forms of demand do not support 
la Winkul’s claim. These arguments embed a double denial, not 
only of the political views of the members of la Winkul, but also 
of the perspectives of other people of identical self-identification 
who are in solidarity with them, even putting into action other 
forms of political demand. Take note, for example, in what those 
who participated in the Autonomous Parliament referred to in 
note 3 express, “We vindicate and recognize the ancestral authori-
ties: Lonko, Machi, Pillan Kushe, Werken, and Kona of Lof Lafken 
Winkul Mapu, their recovered territory and the legitimacy of their 
self-defense (…) Finally, we warn that we are aware of the plans 
for predation and dispossession. We will not hesitate to take di-
rect action measures to prevent the continued destruction of our 
territory. All forms of struggle are valid in the defense of our wall 
mapu.”
 12 From the Mapuche-Tewelche way of making the world, the Wall 
Mapu encompasses everything we call heaven, earth, and subsoil, 
and all the different existing beings who make it up, be they ku-
jfikecheiem or pu newen ka pu gen, in addition to the che or people 
(Confederación Mapuce of Neuquén 2010).
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